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Abstract
There are many situations where relatives interact while at the same time there is
genetic polymorphism in traits influencing survival and reproduction. Examples include
cheater-cooperator polymorphism and polymorphic microbial pathogens. Environmental
heterogeneity, favoring different traits in nearby habitats, with dispersal between them,
is one general reason to expect polymorphism. Currently there is no formal framework
of social evolution that encompasses genetic polymorphism. We develop such a
framework, thus integrating theories of social evolution into the evolutionary ecology of
heterogeneous environments. We allow for adaptively maintained genetic polymorphism
by applying the concept of genetic cues. We analyze a model of social evolution in a
two-habitat situation with limited dispersal between habitats, in which the average
relatedness at the time of helping and other benefits of helping can differ between
habitats. An important result from the analysis is that alleles at a polymorphic locus
play the role of genetic cues, in the sense that the presence of a cue allele contains
statistical information for an organism about its current environment, including
information about relatedness. We show that epistatic modifiers of the cue
polymorphism can evolve to make optimal use of the information in the genetic cue, in
analogy with a Bayesian decision maker. Another important result is that the genetic
linkage between a cue locus and modifier loci influences the evolutionary interest of
modifiers, with tighter linkage leading to greater divergence between social traits
induced by different cue alleles, and this can be understood in terms of genetic conflict.
Author Summary
The theory of kin selection explains the evolution of helping when relatives interact. It
can be used when individuals in a social group have different sexes, ages or phenotypic
qualities, but the theory has not been worked out for situations where there is genetic
polymorphism in helping. That kind of polymorphism, for instance cheater-cooperator
polymorphism in microbes, has attracted much interest. We include these phenomena
into a general framework of social evolution. Our framework is built on the idea of
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genetic cues, which means that an individual uses its genotype at a polymorphic locus
as a statistical predictor of the current social conditions, including the expected
relatedness in a social group. We allow for multilocus determination of the phenotype,
in the form of modifiers of the effects of the alleles at a polymorphic locus, and we find
that there can be genetic conflicts between modifier loci that are tightly linked versus
unlinked to a polymorphic locus.
Introduction 1
Traditional theories of social evolution in structured populations use reproductive value 2
to describe the fitness effects of variation in helping and harming traits [1–4]. They are 3
applied to population structures such as the two sexes [1], juveniles and adults [3], 4
dispersers and non-dispersers [5], and high- and low-quality individuals [4]. Individuals 5
can, depending on their state, vary in their phenotype, which corresponds to a reaction 6
norm [4], but genetic polymorphism in social traits is not explicitly included in the 7
theory. Although it is recognized that frequency dependence is compatible with social 8
evolution theory [6], questions of the emergence and maintenance of genetic 9
polymorphism in social traits have not been given full attention. This absence is 10
striking, as the possibility of such genetic polymorphism has attracted much interest. 11
Examples of studies in the laboratory and the field span from work on 12
cheater-cooperator polymorphisms [7–15] to investigations of genetic variation in 13
microbial pathogens [16,17]. The possibility that population structure contributes to 14
polymorphism also has support [18–22]. 15
It is already well understood that a social trait, such as an individual’s investment in 16
helping, can evolve to different equilibria depending on the relatedness in social groups 17
in different habitats, with more helping in habitats where there is higher relatedness. 18
We use the concept of genetic cues to extend this insight to situations where there is 19
dispersal between habitats and where the social trait is influenced by several, linked or 20
unlinked, genetic loci. The basic idea of genetic cues [23–26] is that alleles can function 21
as statistical predictors of coming selective conditions for an individual. As a 22
consequence of selection, allele frequencies can differ between local environments, such 23
that possessing particular alleles correlates with local conditions in a manner analogous 24
to environmental cues. Using this insight one can integrate genetic polymorphism into 25
theories of conditional phenotype determination. 26
If the environmental heterogeneity includes characteristics that are important for 27
social evolution, like the size or composition of social groups, the heterogeneity could 28
favor genetic polymorphism in social traits. If so, there will be a correlation between 29
gene frequencies and social characteristics and genes can act as cues of relatedness. To 30
illustrate this general idea we develop a specific model with two habitats. We show that 31
alleles at a cue locus can provide information about social circumstances, such as 32
within-group relatedness and opportunities for cooperation, and that epistatic modifiers 33
of the phenotypic effects of a genetic polymorphism can evolve to make use of this 34
information. We also show that the evolutionary interests of epistatic modifiers can 35
differ depending on their degree of linkage to a polymorphic locus, and we interpret this 36
phenomenon in terms of genetic conflict. 37
Model 38
There are two habitats, each containing a large number of groups. They are formed and 39
dissolved by colonization followed by social interaction and the production of offspring 40
that disperse, and again colonization. A group in habitat i, where i = 1, 2, is founded by 41
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Ni haploid individuals, randomly derived from a pool of dispersers in that habitat. To 42
implement variation between habitats in average within-group relatedness, group 43
members reproduce asexually following founding, forming Ni haploid offspring group 44
members, such that each founding group member has an equal and independent chance 45
of producing each of the Ni offspring (model details are given in S1 Text). A smaller Ni 46
thus corresponds to higher relatedness. For a pair of group members, the probability of 47
being identical by descent since founding is 48
ri =
1
Ni
, (1)
which follows [27] and [28]. The offspring group members engage in a social interaction, 49
for instance a public goods game [29], and produce dispersing offspring in proportion to 50
the payoff in the game. An individual’s phenotype z represents an investment (strategy) 51
in the game, and we assume 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. The payoff to an individual with phenotype z in 52
habitat i is a function wi(z, z¯) of z and the average investment z¯ of the individual’s 53
group. As a convenient example we will use wi(z, z¯) = Wi + biz¯ − ciz2, where the 54
benefit biz¯ is proportional to the average investment and the cost ciz
2 is assumed to 55
increase quadratically with the individual’s investment. For polymorphic populations 56
the group compositions will vary, and we are particularly interested in the expected 57
payoff in habitat i to a randomly chosen rare mutant player of the game with phenotype 58
z′, in a population where the resident phenotypes z1 and z2 occur with frequencies pi1 59
and pi2 (where pi1 + pi2 = 1). We write this as 60
w¯′i = E[wi(z
′, z¯)|z1, z2, pi1, pi2]. (2)
Because a new group is founded by random dispersers, those groups containing mutant 61
strategies will predominantly be founded by one mutant and Ni − 1 resident types. 62
Some basic aspects of the model are illustrated in Fig. 1. 63
Figure 1. Elements of the model. Panel (A) shows the population cycles in
habitat 1 (color coded blue) and habitat 2 (red), including formation of social groups
and playing the public goods game, resulting in the production of dispersing offspring,
some of which go to the dispersal pool in their birth habitat and some go the pool in
the other habitat. New social groups are then formed from the pool in each habitat. (B)
The expected payoff (2) for mutant trait z′ in habitat 1 (blue) and habitat 2 (red) in
the limit of no between-habitat dispersal. The resident traits in habitats 1 and 2 are z1
and z2 (blue and red vertical lines). The gray curve shows mutant payoff when there is
random dispersal, with the same two resident traits. (C) Illustration of group formation
for two groups in habitat 1 with N1 = 3. First founding group members are randomly
drawn from the dispersal pool, followed by asexual reproduction forming N1 offspring,
each of which is a copy of a randomly selected parent in the founding group. (D) For a
rare mutant (darker blue), founding groups with mutants will predominantly contain a
single mutant. The offspring groups can contain from 0 to N1 mutants, and in
expectation contain one mutant.
To study the invasion of mutant traits, we need the derivative of the expected 64
mutant payoff, which we write as 65
dik =
∂w¯′i
∂z′
∣∣∣∣
z′=zk
=
bi
Ni
(
1 + (Ni − 1)ri
)− 2cizk, (3)
for habitat i and phenotype zk, i = 1, 2, k = 1, 2. We study evolutionary change of a 66
dimorphism z1, z2 by examining the invasion of mutant modifiers. Let x1 and x2 denote 67
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two alleles at the cue locus. In the resident population, the genetic cue xk induces the 68
phenotype zk, and nik is the number of individuals in habitat i with phenotype zk at a 69
population dynamical equilibrium. The epistatic effect of a mutant modifier is that xk 70
instead induces the phenotype z′k. Letting n
′
ik denote the (small) number of mutant 71
modifiers in habitat i with phenotype z′k (i.e., linked to cue allele xk), we can write 72
down a population projection matrix for the mutant invasion. The invasion fitness of 73
the mutant modifier is 74
F (z′1, z
′
2; z1, z2) = log λ, (4)
where λ is the leading eigenvalue of the population projection matrix. Here we give an 75
overview of the derivation of this matrix (details are given in S1 Text). 76
For simplicity, we assume that individuals are haploid over most of the life cycle. 77
However, to explore the consequences of recombination between cue and modifier loci, 78
we introduce sexual reproduction by assuming there is a brief sexual phase in the 79
dispersal pool in a habitat. This involves diploid individuals and crossing over, with a 80
recombination rate ρ between cue and modifier loci, to produce the haploid individuals 81
that found the groups as described above. Mating is random with respect to the 82
dispersal pool and occurs before the forming of groups in the habitat. As a census point, 83
we specify the population composition at a time after the sexual phase, when groups 84
have formed and the public goods game is about to start. The sequence of events in the 85
life cycle, starting right after the census point, is as follows: (i) public goods game with 86
offspring production in proportion to payoff, (ii) within- and between-habitat migration 87
of these offspring, forming a dispersal pool in each habitat, (iii) mating and 88
recombination, and (iv) the next episode of group formation, including one asexual 89
generation. By putting these events together, one can write down the matrix (see S1 90
Text). Using the population dynamics we can also determine the region of coexistence 91
of two phenotypes z1 and z2 for different sets of parameters, by determining when each 92
phenotype can invade a monomorphism of the other (the condition is given in equation 93
(S16) in S1 Text). 94
We compute a selection gradient from the invasion fitness (4) using standard 95
methodology of matrix population models [30]. Because we average over the group 96
compositions (2), our analysis is consistent with the structured population approach to 97
adaptive dynamics [31], and it can also be seen as a direct fitness methodology for social 98
evolution theory [1, 3], also referred to as a personal fitness methodology [6]. 99
In order to check our analytical results, and to illustrate the effects of genetic 100
conflict between cue and modifier loci, we have run individual-based evolutionary 101
simulations corresponding to our model assumptions. As a genotype-phenotype 102
mapping in these simulations, we used a sigmoid function 103
z =
1
1 + exp
(− a0 − agx) (5)
of a ‘liability’ a0 + agx, where x is the effect of an allele at the genetic cue locus, and a0 104
and ag are parameters that are genetically determined by modifier loci (details are given 105
in S1 Text). 106
To compute evolutionary equilibria numerically, we developed a C++ program that 107
follows a path of small steps through z1z2–space, each of which increase the invasion 108
fitness (4), until reaching an equilibrium. We used the Eigen C++ library [32] to 109
compute eigenvalues. For the individual-based evolutionary simulations, we developed 110
C++ programs that directly implemented the sequence of events in the life cycle, using 111
pseudo-random numbers to handle stochastic events, such as recombination and 112
mutation. In the simulations, we used a total populations size of 40 000 and time 113
periods of 40 000 full life cycles or more. 114
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Results 115
Selection gradient We use the methodology of adaptive dynamics and matrix 116
population modeling [30,33] to compute the derivative of invasion fitness for a mutant 117
modifier. The details of the derivation are given on pp. 8-10 of S1 Text, and here we 118
focus on the interpretations in terms of information in a cue. The genetic cue provides 119
information to an individual about its current habitat. The prior probability of being in 120
habitat i is qi = ni/(n1 + n2), where ni = ni1 + ni2 is the number of individuals in 121
habitat i at a population dynamical equilibrium and nik is the number of individuals in 122
habitat i with phenotype zk. For an allele at a modifier locus, the probability of being 123
in habitat i, conditional on being linked to allele xk at the cue locus is 124
qik =
pikqi
p1kq1 + p2kq2
=
nik
n1k + n2k
, (6)
where pik = nik/ni. The selection gradient is the derivative of invasion fitness (4) with 125
respect to mutant traits, and can be written 126
∂F
∂z′k
∣∣∣∣
z′k=zk
= V1kd1kpkq1k + V2kd2kpkq2k. (7)
To interpret this expression, note that q1k and q2k are the respective probabilities of 127
being in habitat 1 or 2, conditional on being linked to cue allele xk. The factor 128
pk = (n1k + n2k)/(n1 + n2) is a ‘dilution factor’ that appears because the mutant z
′
k is 129
only expressed in individuals with cue allele xk. The d1k and d2k are the derivatives of 130
the expected payoff (2) in habitats 1 and 2 with respect to the mutant trait, and are 131
given in (3). Finally Vik is the reproductive value of an offspring of a player in habitat i 132
with cue allele xk. From the manner in which the conditional probability qik appears in 133
the expression, we can conclude that the selection gradient describes changes in payoff 134
to a ‘Bayesian decision maker at the modifier locus’. Equation (7) is an extension of the 135
direct fitness approach of social evolution theory to situations with genetic 136
polymorphism at the cue locus. Note that this selection gradient refers to the invasion 137
of mutant modifiers, and not to the invasion of alleles at the cue locus, except for the 138
special case of full linkage (ρ = 0), for which cue and modifier form a unit. 139
Completing the life cycle, through migration, mating and recombination, and group
formation, we can express Vik in terms of reproductive values vjl at our census point:
Vik = v11φ1h11km1i + v21φ2h21km2i+ (8)
v12φ1h12km1i + v22φ2h22km2i.
Here, mji is the rate of migration from habitat i to j. The ‘cue inheritance’ is described 140
by 141
hjlk = (1− ρ)δlk + ρpjl, (9)
so that with probability 1− ρ the cue allele is passed to offspring and with probability ρ 142
the offspring receives its cue allele through recombination with a random individual in 143
the dispersal pool. Finally, φj is the probability for an individual in the dispersal pool 144
in habitat j to become a founding group member. 145
We must also examine whether or not polymorphism can be maintained at the cue 146
locus. This needs to be investigated as a separate question, by determining when each 147
of the phenotypes z1 and z2 can invade a monomorphism of the other. The condition 148
for this is given in equation (S16) in S1 Text. 149
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Illustration 150
Figure 2 shows how the migration rate m between habitats and the recombination rate 151
ρ between cue and modifier loci influence dimorphic evolutionary equilibria, i.e. 152
phenotypes where the selection gradient (7) vanishes. The blue and red curves indicate 153
phenotypes z1 and z2 suited to habitats with low and high relatedness. The selection 154
gradient is illustrated in Fig. 3 for a few values of m and ρ, and the shaded regions in 155
this figure show where a polymorphism at the cue locus is maintained. In this example, 156
the only difference between habitats is the number of founders of a social group, with 157
N1 = 20 in habitat 1 and N2 = 2 in habitat 2, so it is appropriate to interpret the 158
genetic cue as a cue of relatedness. 159
Figure 2. Evolutionary equilibrium dimorphisms. The equilibrium dimorphisms
z1 and z2, color coded blue and red, are plotted as functions of the rate of
recombination ρ between cue and modifier loci. The two habitats differ in the size of
social groups, with N1 = 20 and N2 = 2, resulting in lower relatedness in habitat 1
(r1 = 0.05) than in habitat 2 (r2 = 0.5). Three examples are shown, labeled with the
rate of migration between habitats: m12 = m21 = m = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10. The total
population size is the same in both habitats, and the parameters for the public goods
game are also the same: W1 = W2 = 0.5, b1 = b2 = 3.0, c1 = c2 = 1.5. The gray
horizontal line shows the equilibrium of gradual evolution in a monomorphic population,
which does not depend on m or ρ. The dark gray points (with error bars) at ρ = 0.0
and ρ = 0.5, shifted slightly left and right for visibility, show mean and standard
deviation of the average phenotype over 10 replicate individual-based evolutionary
simulations. In these simulations, ag in (5) was encoded by a single locus whereas a0
was kept at a fixed value (see S1 Text for further explanation).
Figure 3. Trait evolution plots for dimorphisms. In each example, the shaded
region shows where a dimorphism z1, z2 can be maintained, the arrows indicate the
direction and magnitude of the selection gradient (7), and the dots show evolutionarily
equilibrium dimorphisms. The examples differ in between-habitat migration rate
m12 = m21 = m and rate of recombination ρ. (A) m = 0.05, ρ = 0.001; (B) m = 0.05,
ρ = 0.5; (C) m = 0.10, ρ = 0.001; (D) m = 0.10, ρ = 0.5. Other parameters: N1 = 20
and N2 = 2, W1 = W2 = 0.5, b1 = b2 = 3.0, c1 = c2 = 1.5.
As seen in Fig. 2, there is an interaction between the migration rate and the 160
recombination rate, such that for very low migration rate (m = 0.01) the recombination 161
rate has little influence on the equilibrium dimorphism, whereas for a higher migration 162
rate (m = 0.10) the difference between z1 and z2 varies considerably from tight linkage 163
to free recombination. For even higher rates of between-habitat migration, genetic 164
polymorphism is not maintained at the cue locus, regardless of the cue-modifier 165
recombination rate ρ, and the outcome is instead a monomorphism. For the parameter 166
values in Fig. 2, this happens for m = 0.15 or higher. 167
Genetic conflicts 168
The divergence between z1 and z2 depends on ρ, as in Figs. 2 and 3, because modifier 169
alleles with different linkage to cue alleles have different demographic futures, and thus 170
different evolutionary interests. A fully linked mutant modifier will remain more 171
concentrated in one of the habitats, which tends to favor specialization to that habitat, 172
whereas an unlinked one will fairly quickly become evenly distributed over cue alleles 173
and habitats, which tends to favor less specialized phenotypes. This difference in 174
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evolutionary interest between modifiers follows the logic of genetic conflicts [34], in the 175
sense that the invasion of a loosely linked modifier, reducing the divergence between 176
phenotypes, creates the context for the invasion of a more tightly linked modifier that 177
reverses this effect. The outcome of genetic conflicts can depend on such things as the 178
of the availability of mutations, the genetic architecture of a trait, and the strength of 179
selection. 180
For modifiers of polymorphic effects, genetic conflicts can have the further 181
consequence of changing selection acting on the additive effects of alleles at a locus from 182
stabilizing to disruptive, potentially giving rise to selectively maintained polymorphism 183
at that locus. For instance, for the case of m = 0.10 in Fig. 2, unlinked modifiers favor a 184
very small divergence between z1 and z2, but once this outcome has been achieved, the 185
selection on alleles at other loci with additive effects on z becomes disruptive (just as 186
originally for the cue locus itself). Genetic polymorphism might then be transferred 187
from an original cue locus to a new locus. 188
How this can happen is illustrated by the individual-based simulations in Fig. 4. The 189
genotype-phenotype mapping (5) from the genetic cue x to the trait z has been changed 190
from that in Fig. 2, where the parameter a0 was fixed, to one where both parameters a0 191
and ag are genetically determined and can evolve. In Fig. 4A, a0 and ag are each 192
determined by a single locus, either fully linked or unlinked to each other and to the cue 193
locus. When m is small or when ρ = 0, the outcome of the individual-based simulations 194
remains in agreement with the predictions from the selection gradient (7), but for 195
m = 0.10 and ρ = 0.5, the outcome is instead the same as that for m = 0.10 and ρ = 0 196
(Fig. 4B). The reason is that, starting with polymorphism at the cue locus, ag evolved 197
to become small, reducing the divergence between the phenotypes from (5), which in 198
turn gave rise to disruptive selection on a0, causing polymorphism to evolve at that 199
locus, while the polymorphism at the original cue locus collapsed. The end result was 200
that the locus coding for a0 became a polymorphic cue locus, with phenotypes z1, z2 in 201
accordance with the evolutionary interests of fully linked modifiers of this new 202
polymorphism (Fig. 4B). Other conceivable evolutionary outcomes of disruptive 203
selection on a0 are shown in Fig. 4C and 4D. 204
In Fig. 4C, 5 unlinked loci have small positive effects on a0 and 5 have small 205
negative effects, and each of these loci became polymorphic in the simulation, while at 206
the same time the original genetic cue locus remained polymorphic. The overall effect 207
was a fairly broad distribution of values for the investment z. In Fig. 4D, the maximum 208
expression at the loci with positive and negative effects was controlled by two separate 209
unlinked loci, and one of these became polymorphic, giving rise to a bimodal 210
distribution of values of z. In these examples, a notable amount of genetic variation in z 211
evolved, but the width and shape of the distribution of z depended on the details of the 212
genetic architecture of the trait. In all cases, an individual gains information about its 213
current habitat from its genotype, and one can show that the clearcut polymorphism in 214
Fig. 4B is the most informative, with progressively less information on average in Fig. 4 215
C and D, as illustrated in Fig. 5. The latter cases are intermediate between the 216
evolutionary interests of fully linked and unlinked modifiers. 217
Discussion 218
We have shown how adaptively maintained genetic polymorphism can be integrated into 219
social evolution theory by making use of the concept of genetic cues. The selection 220
gradient we derived (in equation (7)) parallels the direct, or personal, fitness approach 221
to social evolution in class-structured populations [3, 6], with the distinction that the 222
presence of a cue allele in an individual’s genotype, rather than a phenotypic state, 223
defines the class structure. In our model, individuals use strategies that are conditional 224
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Figure 4. Results from individual-based simulations, illustrating
consequences of genetic conflict. (A) Same as the simulations in Fig. 2 except that
a0, in addition to ag, in (5) is determined by a single locus. The blue and red points
(with error bars) show the deviating outcome for m = 0.10, ρ = 0.5, which is a
consequence of genetic conflict between the cue locus and the locus encoding ag: ag
became close to zero, but a0 became polymorphic, and the polymorphism at the original
cue locus collapsed. The outcome is further illustrated in (B), showing a
kernel-smoothed distribution of phenotypes in a typical simulation. The blue and red
vertical lines show the prediction from Fig. 3C, where ρ = 0, and the blue and red
dashed lines the prediction from Fig. 3D, where ρ = 0.5. The outcome where an
unlinked modifier (a0) takes over the polymorphism depends on the genetic architecture,
as illustrated in (B), (C) and (D). In (C) the modifiers a0 and ag in (5) are each
determined by several loci with small additive effects, and the loci contributing to a0 all
became polymorphic. In (D) there is a more complex architecture for a0, with additive
effects that in turn can be modified with an adjustable threshold limiting the amount of
gene expression, and this threshold became polymorphic (see text and S1 Text for
further explanation).
Figure 5. Illustration of the information contained in genetic cues. Panel (A)
shows the conditional probability of being in habitat 1 (with r1 = 0.05) for an individual
possessing cue allele x1 (blue curves, q11) versus cue allele x2 (red curves, q12). The
probability is given as a function of the recombination rate ρ between cue and modifier
loci. The three cases are from Fig. 2, with different rates of between-habitat migration
m12 = m21 = m = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10. The blue lines in panels (B) to (D) show logistic
regressions of habitat 1 on the liability a0 + agx in equation (5), for the individual-based
simulations in Fig. 4B to 4D (with m = 0.10 and ρ = 0.5). The distributions of this
liability are shown in gray, and the vertical blue and red lines indicate ‘typical’ low and
high values (mean ± sd for (C) and (D)). See S1 Text for further explanation.
on a genetic cue, but our general approach can incorporate a combination of genetic, 225
environmental and transgenerational cues [26,35]. 226
Just as is the case in standard social-evolution theory, relatedness enters into our 227
model as a description of the genetic structure of social groups. The structure refers to 228
genetic variation at epistatic modifier loci, rather than at genetic cue loci, so the 229
relatedness parameter ri in the pay-off derivative (3) refers to rare mutants at a 230
modifier locus. This is in accordance with the general idea of treating genetic variation 231
at a cue locus as input to a developmental or ‘decision-making’ system, and then to 232
examine long-term evolution of the developmental system [24,26]. The value of this 233
perspective is that it guides the analysis and interpretation by forming a link to the 234
study of conditional strategies, such as the study of phenotypic plasticity. 235
The different ways in which individuals gain information about themselves and their 236
social partners has figured importantly in social-evolution theory [2]. For instance, 237
migrant individuals arriving in a local population have different expectations of 238
relatedness to their neighbors than non-dispersers [5]. The possibility that individuals 239
can recognize kin through similarity in genetically polymorphic traits has been 240
investigated, with the conclusion that this can evolve in spatially structured 241
populations [36–38]. Yet another possibility is that individuals could estimate their 242
degree of inbreeding, and thus how likely they are to be related to their neighbors, using 243
their relative homozygosity as a cue [39]. Our concept of genetic cues of relatedness is 244
an instance of this general category, but differs from the other examples through its 245
affinity to the phenomenon of local adaptation in the face of gene flow, which has been 246
much studied in evolutionary ecology. 247
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We found that the genetic linkage between cue and modifier loci can influence the 248
evolutionary outcome (Fig. 2, 3), and this gives rise to genetic conflicts. Genes unlinked 249
to a genetic cue locus tend to favor phenotypes that are less specialized to particular 250
habitats compared to tightly linked genes, because unlinked genes become adapted to 251
exist in all habitats, be transferred between them, and to use the information in a 252
genetic cue to adjust the phenotype in an optimal way for this situation. Tightly linked 253
genes, on the other hand, might be selected to perform well in only one of the habitats, 254
even at the expense of performance in another habitat. The reason is that a modifier 255
allele tightly linked to a cue locus allele can become concentrated to one of the habitats, 256
with the other habitat acting as a sink, to which little adaptation takes place [40,41]. 257
Our results on the role of genetic conflicts in giving rise to disruptive selection at 258
modifier loci (Fig. 4) extends the previous understanding of genetic conflicts when there 259
is adaptively maintained genetic polymorphism [24]. Disruptive selection in 260
heterogeneous environments can maintain genetic polymorphism [42], and genetic cue 261
polymorphism is an example of this general phenomenon. So, if unlinked or loosely 262
linked modifiers of a genetically polymorphic locus evolve to reduce or eliminate the 263
divergence between phenotypes, there will be disruptive selection at loci with additive 264
effects on the phenotype in question. Theoretical modeling has found that disruptive 265
selection tends to favor genetic architectures where polymorphism is concentrated to a 266
single locus [23,43], but as we have shown, constraints on the set of genotype-phenotype 267
mappings can lead to intermediate outcomes between a single-locus polymorphism and 268
polygenic variation where each locus has a small effect (Fig. 4). 269
A basic question for evolutionary theory is whether evolutionary change can be seen 270
as optimizing some form of fitness for the organism or individual [44]. Our analysis of 271
genetic conflicts throws new light on the issue. It is reasonable to regard unlinked 272
modifiers of effects at a polymorphic locus as representing the evolutionary interest of 273
the organism, because unlinked, small-effect mutant modifiers share their demographic 274
future with the organism. Our results in Fig. 4 – that disruptive selection can act to 275
diminish the control exercised by unlinked modifiers over the degree of phenotypic 276
specialization – illustrate how individual optimization might be circumvented when 277
there is genetic polymorphism. Also, our individual-based simulations with multilocus 278
genetic architectures resulted in evolutionary outcomes that were intermediate between 279
the evolutionary interests of linked and unlinked modifiers (Fig. 4C, D, Fig. 5C, D). 280
This fits with the general idea of the organism as a compromise between different 281
evolutionary interests [45,46]. 282
In conclusion, our framework broadens the scope of social evolution theory, by 283
accounting for adaptively maintained genetic variation in heterogeneous environments 284
and by incorporating evolutionary outcomes over the range from genetic specialism to 285
generalism. Many instances of interactions between relatives in nature are likely to be 286
found somewhere between the extremes of such a spectrum. A major insight from our 287
work is that positions along this spectrum can correspond to the degree of genetic 288
linkage between polymorphic loci and epistatic modifiers of the phenotype in question. 289
Our analysis thus delivers potentially testable predictions about the evolution of 290
epistasis between modifiers and polymorphic loci and can inspire empirical investigation 291
of the importance of genetic cues of relatedness. 292
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Details of model description, results and individual-based simulations. 295
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